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RONALD J. BACIGAL 
Hearings on Jury Bias or Misconduct 
THE general rule in Virginia and in the federal sys· 
tem has always been that "the deliberations of the 
jury and the motives which actuate them in arriving 
at a verdict are secret and usually even jurors them· 
selves will not be allowed to impeach their verdict" 
during the polling process or by subsequent affi· 
davit. 1 The major exception to this general rule 
involves situations where outside influence upon the 
jury has affected the defendant's constitutional right 
to an impartial jury. In the recent cases of Smith v. 
Phillips,2 and Rushen v. Spain,3 the United States 
Supreme Court recognized that judicial review of ex 
parte contacts with a sitting jury may raise a number 
of separate but interrelated constitutional rights: (1) 
the right to an impartial jury; (2) the right to a due 
process post-trial hearing on jury bias; (3) a possible 
due process right to a mid-trial hearing on jury bias; 
(4) the defendant's right to be present at such mid· 
trial hearings; and (5) the right to be represented at 
such mid-trial hearings. 
As Justice Stevens noted in his concurring opinion 
in Rushen, confusion abounds in identifying these 
rights and applying them in a factual context. This 
article suggests that the various rights and proce· 
dures can best be understood by distinguishing 
between post-trial and mid-trial inquiries into jury 
bias. 
Post-Trial Hearings 
In Remmer v. United States, 4 there was a purported 
attempt to influence a juror and a follow-up FBI 
investigation which included an interview of the 
juror. Because the trial judge did not learn of the 
situation until after trial, there was no opportunity for 
any mid-trial corrective action. The United States 
Supreme Court, however, ordered a post-trial hearing 
into the impartiality of the juror. and recognized a 
presumption of prejudice whict-. · · .e prosecution must 
overcome at the hearing. Because proof of jury bias is 
often difficult to obtain in a post-trial hearing/' plac· 
ing the burden of proof upon the prosecution often 
determines the substantive issue.6 
Although Remmer has not been overruled, the 
burden of proof may have been shifted to the defense 
in the more recent case of Smith v. Phillips.1 In 
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Smith, as in Remmer, the trial judge learned after the 
verdict that there might have been juror misconduct. 
(During the trial a juror had submitted an application 
for employment as an investigator in the District 
Attorney's Office.) Because there was no opportunity 
for mid-trial corrective action, the defendant was 
entitled to a Remmer type post-trial hearing. Surpris· 
ingly, the Smith opinion cited Remmer but did not 
mention Remmer's presumption of prejudice. The 
Supreme Court held that due process merely requires 
that the defendant have an "opportunity to prove 
actual bias." 
It may be that Smith has overturned the Remmer 
presumption, however, Smith and Remmer can both 
be read as valid law if each is limited to a distinct 
situation. Remmer involved third party contact with 
a juror, and the presumption of prejudice may apply 
only when third party contact exists. Smith, however, 
did not involve any third party contact but only the 
juror's own possible misconduct which raised the 
issue of potential bias. When no third party contact 
exists, the Remmer presumption of prejudice may be 
inapplicable and the burden to prove actual prejudice 
may shift to the defendant. A Fourth Circuit case 
questioning the relationship between Remmer and 
Smith is before the Supreme Court on a petition for 
certiari,8 but it may be some time before the Court 
provides any guidance as to the continuing validity of 
the Remmer presumption. 
Mid-Trial Inquiries Into Jury Bias 
In situations such as Remmer and Smith there was 
no opportunity for mid-trial inquiries into jury bias, 
thus the defendant was limited to a post-trial hearing 
on possible juror misconduct. A different situation 
arises, however, when the trial court learns of possi· 
hie misconduct or outside influence before the 
conclusion of the trial. In Rushen v. Spain,9 a juror 
went to the trial judge's chambers to disclose her per· 
sonal knowledge of facts relevant to the case. The 
judge questioned the juror about her ability to be 
impartial, but the judge made no record of the conver· 
sation and did not inform the defendants or their 
counsel about the in-chambers conversations. After 
trial, defense counsel learned of the ex parte commun· 
ications between judge and juror and moved for a new 
trial. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
affirming the granting of a new trial on the grounds 
that an unrecorded ex parte communication between 
trial judge and juror can never be harmless error. 
Rushen thus raiAed issues quite distinct from 
Remmer and Smith. Remmer and Smith addressed 
only the due process right to a post-trial hearing on 
jury impartiality, while Rushen raised questions of 
the right of the defendant and defense counsel to be 
present during mid-trial communications between 
judge and juror regarding jury bias. Unfortunately, 
the Supreme Court did not resolve these issues 
because the government conceded error and main-
tained that such errors were harmless. The Rushen 
majority held only that if it was error to exclude the 
defendant and counsel from the in-chambers com-
munications, such error could be found harmless at a 
post-trial hearing. It must be recognized that the 
burden of proof at such a hearing is quite distinct 
from the burden at a Smith-type hearing. Under 
Smith, the defense must establish a violation of the 
right to an impartial jury. Under Rushen, the prose-
cution must establish that violations of the right to be 
present and represented by counsel are harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Rushen is a very limited case because it addressed 
application of the harmless error doctrine without 
deciding whether error existed. Based on dicta in the 
case, however, the Supreme Court seems prepared to 
recognize the right to personal presence and the right 
to counsel at all substantive10 communications be-
tween judge and jury. Although the court noted that 
the constitutional dimension of such rights was not in 
issue in the case, the Court referred to such rights as 
"fundamental rights." Having gone this far in dicta it 
would be difficult for the Court to subsequently hold 
that such rights are not of a constitutional dimension. 
In fact, it may be difficult for the Court to stop short of 
the approach taken by the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals which identified four necessary components 
for the proper disposition of any communication 
between judge and jury. (1) The jury's inquiry should 
be submitted in writing. (2) It should be marked as a 
court exhibit and read into the record in the presence 
of counsel and the defendant. (3) Counsel should be 
afforded an opportunity to suggest appropriate re-
sponses. ( 4) Messages from a jury should be answered 
in open court.11 
Summary 
Pending further clarification from the Supreme 
Court, confusion will continue as to the nature of the 
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various hearings on jury bias or misconduct. It is pos-
sible, however, to outline some general guidance for 
counsel. (1) In situations where allegations of jury 
bias or misconduct first come to light after the verdict, 
the defense is entitled to a due process hearing on jury 
impartiality. At such hearings, it is unclear whether 
the prosecution must overcome a presumption of 
prejudice (Remmer v. United States) or whether the 
defense must prove actual bias (Smith v. Phillips). (2) 
In cases where such allegations arise prior to verdict, 
it is unclear whether the defense has a right to a mid-
trial hearing on jury bias. 12 (3) If the trial judge does 
conduct a mid-trial hearing, there is strong dicta, but 
no actual Supreme Court holding, that the defendant 
and counsel have a right to participate in the hearing 
(Rushen v. Spain). (4) Denial of the right to be pres1mt 
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and to participate in a mid-trial hearing can later be 
found to be harmless error in a post-trial hearing 
where the government must prove harmlessness 
beyond a reasonable doubt. (Rushen v. Spain). 
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